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Generally, civil society is a system of non-governmental and non-profit “privately organized citizens[1].” Transnational civil society refers to “self-organized advocacy groups that undertake voluntary collective action across state borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest[2].” Unlike government authorities like antiterrorism and other transnational anti-criminal agencies, transnational civil societies do not use ammunition in their operations. They also do not have at their disposal economic powers linked corporations or government agencies. This gives them a puzzling influence on contemporary transnational civil programs. The transnational civil societies began in the early 1950s with the aim of protecting human rights by campaigning for disarmament of Russia[3]. Although it is difficult to argue that private citizens have the capability to influence the world politics, their collective network across the borders have significant influence on the world politics. Examples of transnational civil societies that are active today are Amnesty International and Transparency International.
TSCs derive their authorities from expertise, claim to political legitimacy, and moral influence[4]. Scientists have profound influence on the contemporary issues and many of them usually capitalize on their expertise by working for politicians to reinforce preferred policies. Sometimes experts provide objective knowledge that is ideally compromised. The legitimacy of the Amnesty International vests on “its reputation as a disinterested third party actor[5]” with ‘apolitical’ expertise. The TSC has the moral authority to fight for individuals’ rights under subjugation of the government. This moral authority is what underscores the transnational activists’ influence on important issues, and therefore citizens have great confidence in them. Most citizens trust TSCs to provide accurate information concerning political processes, particularly in democratically deficient countries.
In practice, TSCs always identify an issue on global agenda; get institutional procedures and international actors who push for their dianoetic stance to influence actor behaviour and policy changes. Ideally, TCS actors not only seek to influence the identities and interests of characters, but also the milieu in that these actors operate. Given that many actors are driven by material power, the paper accentuate how activists push for international ideas and norms to change government policies and practices, civil society, corporations, and intergovernmental organizations. Recent studies on TCS downplays the concept of constructionism theory of rationale divide due to fact that it does not adequately focus on agency, and as such, most recent research encompasses the combination of instrumentalist and persuasive antics that TSCs employ[6].
Operationally, TSC like Amnesty International sets agenda by recognizing a problem of global concern and then produces information[7]. The second step is that it develops solutions by designing norms and providing recommendations on policy change[8]. The next step usually involves developing networks of coalitions and allies. The TCS then implements solutions by applying pressure, employing persuasive antics, or encouraging compliance with the set norms. The creation and implementation of the new norms have high chances of success and they can be engrafted more firmly compared to the previous norms. For instance, if Amnesty International established new international norms regarding extrajudicial killings, which was positioned on international agenda and entrenched on the human rights provisions without much ado[9].
Amnesty International has been making efforts to accomplish legal and political objectives by making gradual steps towards influencing UN resolutions. This has succeeded in opening windows for Amnesty International push for particular norms on the reaffirmed principles. Amnesty International can invoke principles that already entrenched in the Universal Declaration and use them as the agenda for their campaigns in a later date. This transforms the initial weak expressions into strong rallying points. Concisely, TSCs have the efficacy to institutionalize initially weak norms. Amnesty’s capability to institutionalize weak norms is underpinned on “preference for principles over expedient compromises[10].”
However, in the case of the Transparency International, the activists have been fighting corruption by appealing to both self-interest and principles as well as seeking to develop policy-building coalitions that are aimed at reforming corrupt systems instead of exposing corruption scandals. Efforts of direct actionists and grassroots tend to be effectual particularly if there is unfavourable political condition and NGO elites are committed to deliver change. Public campaigns and actionists use messages that raise expectations hence piling pressure, which make political decision-makers insecure hence encouraging them to seek solutions and reassurance from the incrementalists[11]. When the activists succeed in their actions, new issues emerge, political opportunities surfaces, and activism targets develop new forms of resistance to counteract the backlash. The success of the activism depends on the how the elite lobby groups are organized and the possibility of the target government to use security forces against such campaigns versus its sensibility to protect its reputation on the international space.
Since 1980s, the subject of diaspora has received divergent views between scholars that attempt to delineate the term and confine its expanding use and social constructionists that challenge the predominant assumptions and emerging definitions of diaspora[12]. Consequently, we are led towards understanding diaspora that downplays absolute, deep-rooted, and simplistic presumptions about home, and therefore allowing complexity that conceive home as a physical reality where one has lived or is yearning for. In the context of diaspora, this notion defines home as “an imagined myth” that is no longer in existence but only arouse feelings of alienation, familiarity, and nostalgia[13]. In this section, the paper encompasses brief history about the term diaspora and examines how it has evolved to become more complex in definition.
Originally, the term ‘diaspora’ was used to refer to the dispersed Jews from Israel. The term originated from the two Greek words dia— meaning ‘through’ and speirein— meaning ‘to disperse.’ In this context, diaspora was understood as “physical dispersion of people from the common point of origin[14].” In the 1960s, ‘diaspora’ was used to refer to the dispersion of the Greeks, Armenians, and Africans— classical Diasporas. In the 1980s, however, the term was commonly used to refer to a broad motley of migration groups like immigrants, political refugees, guest workers, racial minorities, expellees, and alien residents. This amazing expansion of the term is what has triggered debate among scholars concerning the term. Scholars who opposed the broad meaning of the term argue that “if everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so.” Different typologies and definitions have since been developed to restore the meaning of the term diaspora[15].
In 1991, a group of scholars attempted to define diaspora by focusing on the homeland orientation and ignoring other components of diaspora experiences. The definition was entrenched on six-part model: a community that is scattered away from the motherland, retains memory about the motherland, keeps their boundaries with their host community because they fear exclusion, have intentions of returning in case of favourable conditions, keeps supporting their folks in homelands, and keeps communicating with them. Considerably, this is one of the most restrictive and systematic description of the term diaspora. The definition emphasizes on the significance of motherland as evident in four out of the six essential characteristics. Dufoix’s (2016) definition of diaspora also identifies the salience of homeland orientation but accommodates the notion of “imagined homeland.[16]” The author develops typology of diaspora that includes catastrophic, cultural, imperial, and trade diasporas.
While the aforementioned definitions have different approaches regarding the concept of diaspora, they meet at a focal point: homeland, return, and the home experiences— nostalgia-premised. However, another school of thought holds dissenting view about the backward-looking, return-oriented, absolute presumptions of home. These scholars point out flaws in the aforementioned definitions by stressing that people in diaspora think about new ways concerning “home and the past” and therefore they focus on making new homes and securing quality life in future. Another reason for dissent is hinged in the notion that the ambition of returning home is not central to the identity of the people in diaspora or favourable conditions. Additionally, critics hold that it is not easy to determine singular homeland since it is historically ambiguous. Similarly, the process of diaspora has the tendency to hybrid or tamper with the feelings of being away from home. Another central of argument is that the definitions downplay the capability of diaspora experience to transform individuals, and the next generation in particular[17].
Diaspora manifests itself in terms of people’s traditions, cultures, and not just geographical location. For instance, “Caribbean diaspora were not with Africa, but with other dispersed people of African origin[18].” This implies that, in essence, diaspora does not have to be tied to physical location. Rather, the definition should be in light of its ability to develop connections between individuals and revivify a culture in different parts of the world.
Due to increasing globalization, international educational exchange programs, international marriages, political conflicts, and immigration, the subject of diaspora continues to proliferate the modern society. By plucking out physical location from the definition of diaspora, it is possible to accommodate experiences that capture other populations that have established their permanent residence in their host-land, examples: South Asian population in the United States and Europe, Chinese population in Singapore and Malaysia, and African population in France. Whereas these groups do not intend to return to their motherlands, they are conceived as inhabiting and performing diaspora who continue to harbour the links to their motherland “within the imagination.[19]” Therefore, memories of the ancestral home pay a vital role in these communities’ lives. These prosthetic memories are what influence the next generation who may not have experienced life in their motherlands and therefore such communities remain distinct from their host country even if they affect their external categorization and self-perception.
European Union institutions have constitutive impact on the member states domestic processes as well as the domestic politics. The influence of the European Union to member states is commonly termed as Europeanization. Europeanization refers to the institutional building process that is consistent with the European Union standards[20]. Broadly, EU institutions sit on the three-legged stool of policies, politics, and polity. Policies deal with instruments, standards, problem-solving techniques, and policy discourses and narratives[21]. On the other hand, politics organ encompass aspects of interest formation, interest representation, interest integration, and public discourses. Polity deals with collective identities, judicial structures, economic institutions, state-society relations, judicial structures, and intergovernmental relations[22]. In every component its constituents, the influence of EU is strongly felt within the member states. The question is no longer, whether EU institutions affect the domestic policies, politics, and polity of the member states, but to what magnitude, to what time, and to which direction.
Based on casual frameworks, recent studies agree that EU institutions are likely to bring domestic change when it is inconvenient. Scholars refer to this situation as “mismatch” or “misfit” EU and domestic institutions, processes, and institutions[23]. In most instances, “the goodness of fit[24]” between EU and the member state’s level is what determines the magnitude of the pressure that for adaption developed EU on the member states. When there is lower compatibility between domestic processes, policies, as well as institutions and EU, the adaptation pressure will be considerably higher. However, if EU institutions fit perfectly well with the domestic processes, institutions, and policies, they degree of pressure for adaption becomes lower. For instance, if the EU environmental regulations are consistent with the domestic policies, there is no need for member states to adjust their legal provisions. Generally, if EU institutional rules, norms, and collective agreements conform to the domestic policies, they do not conjure up the issue of compliance. Similarly, when there is conformity, the EU standards do not provide constraints or new opportunities that are aimed at redistribution of resources to strengthen some actors and weaken others. The European judicial system empowers citizens and the national courts in member states whose legal structures are quintessentially alien to the EU judicial review. On its part, the European Single Market grants exit options to corporate organizations that used to operate under protected markets[25]. Firms that have already tasted the privilege of open competition have very little to benefit from the Single Market.
Adaptation pressure is developed based on the notion that new European polity encapsulates systems of authoritative decision-making that may clash with domestic systems of policy-making, and as such, EU members do not have exit option, considering the fact that “EU law constitute the law of the land[26].” Europeanization leads to misfit of policies in two different ways. First, EU policies may engender policy misfit between domestic policies on one hand and the EU policies on the other hand. Usually, a policy misfit is tantamount compliance problems. Considerably, European policies can challenge regulatory standards, state policy goals, processes, and instruments applied to apply policy goals, as well as the problem-solving approach. Such kind of policy misfit piles pressure on adaptation pressure on the domestic institutions.
Policy misfits give rise to “adaptation cost” at the domestic level[27]. Therefore, member states always strive to establish policies that conform to the European level to foreclose compliance problems. However, considering the fact that the member states may not all the time upload policies that are compatible with the EU preferences, the contest usually spawns patchwork of EU regulations, which emanates from variety of policies, administrative approaches, and problem-solving styles[28]. The regulatory patchwork leads to significant mismatch to the member states whose uploaded preferences do not meet the threshold of EU standards. On the other hand, institutional misfit challenges the domestic procedures and rules as well as the collective agreements that underpin them. For instance, the EU institutions encourage decentralized decision-making as opposed to centralized decision-making[29].
In terms of politics, European policies are entrenched on democratization, constitutionalism, rule of law, and respect to human rights. EU member states are required to align their political systems with such standards. EU also encourages cooperative federalism among the members. This is a consensus-oriented political system that encourages the establishment of the autonomous subnational levels of government. Such kind of government structure improves representations of citizens at grassroots level. Europeanization also encourages the participation of the civil societies and transnational civil societies in the national agenda. Similarly, member states are required to align their laws with the UN stipulations.
International institutions have significant influence on the multilateral cooperation and state policies in various ways[30]. However, in most cases, they tend to apply their influence by deemphasizing open coercion; rather, they accentuate the significance of the information. Since many institutions o not have the capability to coerce their members, they reinforce cooperation by “providing information and expertise” as well as using their authority to define their rules and expectations[31]. Hence, persuasion is an essential aspect of influencing international cooperation. At minimum, trust is key to effectual persuasion. Whenever governments conceive that international institutions are pushing for policies that are inimical to their interest, they brush aside such policy advice. Ideally, “cheap talk is cheap,” and as such, sharing information where conflict of interest exists is difficult[32].
In the recent past, members’ cue on international relations has accentuated trust as a necessary factor in matters of international security[33]. Drawing lessons from Cold War, it is downrightly apparent that solid reputation and international conflict avoidance is premised on telling the truth. Besides, trust is fundamentally important in relations that involve international organizations (IO), but can be challenging particularly when the IO have the intentions of misrepresenting private the information in pursuit of pushing for policies that are in favour of their countries to be chosen by the governments. Prominent international organization like International Monetary Fund (IMF) focuses on the existential tension between international objectives and national agenda. Hence, possibility of conflict of interest between national governments and international bodies is central to “model of persuasion,” which necessitates the presence of a third party who is unbiased to relay truthful information.
However, recent studies show that biased mediators can be more effective compared to the biased ones since the former can relay information that is against their very bias in a more credible fashion[34]. In most cases, governments’ persuasions are only considered credible when their push for policy change does not jeopardize other governments’ policy preference. One of the major significance of the unbiased mediators is to ease tensions that usually exist when international organizations attempt to persuade the sceptical governments about the proposed policy change. Unbiased mediators also enable international organizations to gain trust of the countries that that the information conveyed is consistent with their bias. In essence, predilections of international institutions should conform to the predilections of their member states. During crisis, particularly when economic stability and global health are at the centre of discussion, institution’s preferences may not have similar perspective with all the members’ government. Under such scenarios, unbiased mediators help to facilitate internalization of the global crisis to the dissenting countries. In most instances, defiant governments, not international organizations, bear “the cost of policy responses.”
The unbiased experts help to share the preference of the international institutions by providing the governments with adequate measures to implement policy changes, considering the state of the world. Most of the international organizations’ expected utility becomes higher when experts— in lieu of the governments— push for a certain policy. This is because unbiased experts’ signal are considered more accurate than when IO choses policy on its own.
However, Barnett and Finnermore (2004) hold a divergent view concerning the principle of the agency or the concept of using unbiased mediator to push for the internalization of the change policies. Scholars that support the role of secondary agents in the international organization like IMF[35]. Barnett and Finnermore (2004), proponents of neorealist theory, conceive unbiased mediators as masters of powers who dangle the strings of the IMF and therefore inhibiting its effectiveness[36]. Approaches that introduce unbiased mediators deprive International Monetary Fund its autonomy and give little room for the organization to transform with time. Barnett and Finnermore (2004) challenge the traditional concept of agency mediation and established a theory that that provides framework for assessing International Monetary Fund as “semi-independent actors.” In their argument, they emphasize that international organizations have ideal autonomy and the moral authority to push for policy change[37].
These institutions, according to Barnett and Finnermore (2004), derive their legitimacy from various sources “beyond the limited leeway and resources delegated to them by member-states.” In the context of international relations theory, this argument is substantive in helping to guide the conceptualization of IMF functions, which have been under sharp criticism and sparked global politics over the recent past. However, Barnett and Finnermore acknowledge (2004) that IMF have some flaws, but does not buy the idea of using the neutral agent to ameliorate the situation when there is conflicting interest between the institution and the member states. The authors liken international organizations to bureaucracies that only work effectively when they are autonomous.
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Ann-Marie, Slaughter. A New World Order (Princeton University press). 2004.
Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
Daphne, Josslin, and William Wallace. Non-State Actors in World politics (Palgrabe); 2001.
Dufoix, SteÌphane. The Dispersion: A History of the Word Diaspora. BRILL, 2017.
Espa, Ilaria. 2016. "The Role of the WTO in Addressing Regulatory Pricing Policies in the Energy Sector". Reconceptualising the Rule of Law in Global Governance, Resources, Investment and Trade.. 91-404.
Heupel, Monika, and Theresa Reinold. The Rule of Law in Global Governance. 2016.
Jha, Ganga N. "Defining and redefining diaspora: from theory to reality." Diaspora Studies 7, no. 1 (2014), 72-73. doi:10.1080/09739572.2013.871894.
John, Ruggie. Just Business; Multinational Corporation and Human Rights. 2013.
König, Thomas, Tanja Dannwolf, and Brooke Luetgert. "EU Legislative Activities and Domestic Politics." The Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures, 2011, 21-37. doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-1502-2_2.
Ladrech, Robert L. Europeanization and National Politics (The European Union Series). Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
Lelieveldt, Herman, and Sebastiaan Princen. The Politics of the European Union. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2015.
Liljeblad, Jonathan. "The Pyu Ancient Cities World Heritage application: lessons from Myanmar on transnational advocacy networks." Journal of Civil Society 13, no. 1 (2016), 18-34. doi:10.1080/17448689.2016.1246138.
Mannin, Michael L., and Charlotte Bretherton. Europeanization of European Politics. [Place of publication not identified]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
Margaret, Keck, and Kathryn, Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders (Cornell University Press). 1998.
Peterson, John, and Michael Shackleton. The Institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Philip Cerny (2010), Rethinking World Politics; The Theory of Transnational Neopluralism oxford university press).
Piewitt, Martina, Meike Rodekamp, and Jens Steffek. "Civil Society in World Politics: How Accountable are Transnational CSOs?" Journal of Civil Society 6, no. 3 (2010), 237-258. doi:10.1080/17448689.2010.528946.
Price, Richard. "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics." World Politics 55, no. 04 (2003), 579-606. doi:10.1353/wp.2003.0024.
Rathbun, Brian C. Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and American Multilateralism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
Rayaprol, Aparna. "Defining and Redefining Diaspora: From Theory to Reality." Journal of Intercultural Studies 36, no. 1 (2015), 108-110. doi:10.1080/07256868.2015.991068.
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[1] Richard Price. "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics." World Politics 55, no. 04 (2003):
[2] Price (2003): 580
[3] Martina Piewitt, Meike Rodekamp, and Jens Steffek. "Civil Society in World Politics: How Accountable are Transnational CSOs?" Journal of Civil Society 6, no. 3 (2010): 239
[4] Piewitt et al (2010): 241
[5] Martin Albrow, Hakan Seckinelgin, and Helmut K. Anheier. Global Civil Society 2011. Basingstoke, U.K.:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011: 32
[6] Piewitt et al (2010): 242
[7] Daphne, Josslin, and William Wallace. Non-State Actors in World politics (Palgrabe); 2001.
[8] Amnesty International, last modified 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/
[9] Albrow (2011): 34
[10] Albrow (2011): 144
[11] Jonathan Liljeblad. "The Pyu Ancient Cities World Heritage application: lessons from Myanmar on transnational advocacy networks." Journal of Civil Society 13, no. 1 (2016): 21
[12] Philip Cerny (2010), Rethinking World Politics; The Theory of Transnational Neopluralism oxford university press).
[13] SteÌphane Dufoix. The Dispersion: A History of the Word Diaspora. BRILL, 2017: 27
[14] Undergraduate Library Organization. "What is home?’ Exploring the complexity of homeland and identity within diaspora." Last modified 2017. http://www.undergraduatelibrary.org/system/files/UA%20submission%203%20diaspora.pdf: 2
[15] Undergraduate Library Organization. http://www.undergraduatelibrary.org/system/files/UA%20submission%203%20diaspora.pdf: 3
[16] SteÌphane Dufoix. The Dispersion: A History of the Word Diaspora. BRILL, 2017: 123
[17] Dufoix (2017): 143
[18] Undergraduate Library Organization. http://www.undergraduatelibrary.org/system/files/UA%20submission%203%20diaspora.pdf:4
[19] Aparna Rayaprol. "Defining and Redefining Diaspora: From Theory to Reality." Journal of Intercultural Studies 36, no. 1 (2015):111
[20] Thomas König, Tanja Dannwolf, and Brooke Luetgert. "EU Legislative Activities and Domestic Politics ." The Europeanization of Domestic Legislatures, 2011: 22
[21] John, Ruggie. Just Business; Multinational Corporation and Human Rights. 2013.
[22] Michael Mannin and Charlotte Bretherton. Europeanization of European Politics. [Place of publication not identified]: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016: 109
[23] Herman Lelieveldt, and Sebastiaan Princen. The Politics of the European Union. Cambridge, United Kingdom Cambridge University Press, 2015: 196.
[24] John Peterson, and Michael Shackleton. The Institutions of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012: 214
[25] Peterson and Shacklon (2014): 217
[26] Robert Ladrech L. Europeanization and National Politics (The European Union Series). Palgrave Macmillan, 2011: 312
[27] Peterson and Shacklon (2014): 231
[28] Lelieveldt, and Princen (2015): 197
[29] Lelieveldt, and Princen (2015): 210
[30] Ann-Marie, Slaughter. A New World Order (Princeton University press). 2004.
[31] Monika Heupel and Theresa Reinold. The Rule of Law in Global Governance. 2016: 116
[32] Ilaria Espa. 2016. "The Role of the WTO in Addressing Regulatory Pricing Policies in the Energy Sector". Reconceptualising the Rule of Law in Global Governance, Resources, Investment and Trade: 256
[33] Brian Rathbun C. Trust in International Cooperation: International Security Institutions, Domestic Politics, and American Multilateralism. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012: 321
[34] Williams Robinson. Trust in International Cooperation UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014: 127
[35] Margaret, Keck, and Kathryn, Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders (Cornell University Press). 1998.
[36] Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004:7
[37] Barnett and Finnermore (2004): 14.
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